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ABSTRACT: At first glance, every metaphysics of laws (humeanism, primitivism, power metaphysics) can be combined 
with every ontology of time (eternalism, growing block, presentism). In contrast, this paper intends to show 
that humeanism requires eternalism and that Power metaphysics must presuppose an existentially dynamical 
view of temporal existence, i.e. the growing block view or presentism. The presented arguments turn out to be 
completely independent of whether the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic: the world is non-pro-
ductive and static or productively dynamical, the future be ‘open’ or not.
Keywords: Humeanism; Dispositionalism; Eternalism; Presentism; Growing Block; Indeterminism.
RESUMEN: A primera vista, cualquier metafísica sobre las leyes (Humeanismo, primitivismo, metafísica de Poderes) 
puede ser combinada con cualquier ontología sobre el tiempo (eternalismo, bloque creciente, presentismo). Por 
el contrario, este artículo intenta mostrar que el Humeanismo requiere eternalismo, y que la metafísica de Po-
deres debe presuponer una visión existencialmente dinámica de la existencia temporal, i.e., la teoría del universo 
de bloque creciente o el presentismo. Los argumentos esgrimidos resultan ser completamente independientes 
de si las leyes de la naturaleza son probabilísticas o deterministas: el mundo es no-productivo y estático o pro-
ductivamente dinámico, sea el futuro ‘abierto’ o no.
Palabras clave: Humeanismo; Disposicionalismo; Eternalismo; Presentismo; Bloque Creciente; Indeterminismo.
1. Introduction
The relationship between the metaphysics of laws of nature and the ontology of time is a 
rather under-explored topic.1 As it seems to me, the views about laws are mostly considered 
* I would like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal for very helpful, constructively critical 
comments. Also, many thanks go to the members of the Konstanz “real possibilities” group for their 
effort spent on previous versions of this paper.
1 See, however, Backmann (2016) and Briggs and Forbes (2017) as evidence for increasing interest.
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to be independent of the views about time,2 i.e. every metaphysics of laws seems to be com-
patible with every ontology of time. Secondly, my impression is that according to many au-
thors the crucial issue within the philosophy of time is whether the future is ‘open’ or not.3 
Since the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic independently of their metaphys-
ical status, it again seems to be irrelevant what the underlying ontology of time is.
In contrast, it seems to me initially plausible that a passive understanding of laws re-
quires static time, i.e. “eternalism”, whereas an active understanding of laws requires dy-
namic time, i.e. the “growing block view” or “presentism”, and that both implications are 
independent of the determinism/indeterminism distinction. The purpose of this paper is 
to provide convincing arguments in support of this plausibility. Laws of nature are passive 
just in case they merely supervene on a ‘given’ distribution of objects, events, or properties4; 
this view will be identified with “Humeanism”. They are active just in case they (partly) 
‘generate’ such a distribution on the basis of initial conditions; this view will be identified 
with “Power metaphysics”. So, I will argue that Humeanism requires eternalism, and Power 
metaphysics requires non-eternalism, i.e. the growing block view or presentism.
My purpose is hence to show that the world is passive-static or active-dynamical, inde-
pendently of the future being ‘open’. Before going on, there are apparently many termino-
logical clarifications in order, in particular because I am arguing here across several debates 
(including those from the philosophy of spacetime). Concerning “Power metaphysics”, I 
should exclude the variant according to which the fundamental physical properties such as 
mass and charge —considered as dispositions— ‘generate’ the regularities without any help 
of the laws which merely “flow” (Bird 2007, 2) from them. In that case, the laws would in-
deed be passive, and active only the properties, but Power metaphysics would still require 
dynamic time. Then, I in fact exclude the (possible) variant according to which the rela-
tion between the disposition and its manifestation is merely a (de re) modal relation. In 
that case, one may have the vision that there are ‘already’ existing relata between which, e.g., 
a relation of necessity holds. This would indeed be compatible with eternalism, but would 
fall prey to Lewis’s complaint with Armstrong’s necessity relation: “metaphysical necessity” 
is merely a label when not combined with productive sense. “Power metaphysics” is hence 
restricted to the view that dispositional properties productively cause their manifestations, 
that the manifestations depend existentially on the dispositions. This view requires non-
eternalism.
“Humeanism” is comparatively simple. The fundamental physical tokens such as mass 
and charge are considered to be categorical, i.e. independent of their actual causal role. The 
laws of nature supervene on the ‘totality’ of contingently distributed categorical entities 
(see Lewis 1986, ix). However, note that they are actually dispositional, in the neutral sense 
of the term that they actually play a causal role. The difference to Power metaphysics is that 
according to Humeanism mass and charge do not essentially play that actual causal role; 
they are not essentially dispositional. Thus, Humeanism allows for causal dependence rela-
2 See, e.g., the seminal monograph by Bird (2007) in which he defends his view about laws in confronta-
tion with many issues in metaphysics except those from the ontology of time.
3 See, e.g., Müller (2006) and Hüttemann (2014).—The openness of the future will be identified with 
indeterminism; indeterminism may be lawful or not.
4 Properties are intended to be tropes, i.e. particulars. If one holds that properties are universals, one 
should read “property-tokens” instead of “properties”.
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tions between categorical properties, but excludes productively causal dependence relations. 
Likewise, eternalism allows for several dependence relations between ‘eternally’ existing re-
lata (including alleged non-Humean, but non-productive modal relations), but what Hu-
meanism and eternalism exclude is existential dependency between temporally separated 
entities. Further, I should stress that I will not defend the packages Humeanism/eternalism 
and Powers/non-eternalism as biconditionals. Eternalism, the growing block view, and pre-
sentism are perfectly compatible with the view that there are no laws at all. Also, “primitiv-
ism” of laws seems to be compatible with every ontology of time.5
Concerning “eternalism” (“block universe view”) et al., I will need an extra section 
to spell out the views in an adequate way. Roughly, of course, eternalism says that past, 
present, and future things exist on a par, while the growing block view affirms the existence 
only of past and present entities and presentism only of the present ones. However, no rea-
sonable eternalist intends to say that, e.g., dinosaurs exist now so that there is undoubtedly 
a sense in which dinosaurs do not exist. The challenge is to combine the view that dinosaurs 
(and future things) do not exist now with the view that they ‘nevertheless’ exist simplicit-
er.6 This challenge is satisfied by self-declared eternalists and by (eternalism-descriptions 
of) their opponents in different ways, as I see it. That matters for my present purpose. For, 
if one believes that Humeanism is compatible with non-eternalism, one apparently has 
a different understanding of eternalism in mind as in the case in which one believes that 
Power metaphysics is compatible with eternalism. So, both my opponents have different 
(non-)eternalist views: the first’s view of non-eternalism is —so to speak— not dynamical 
enough, the second’s view of eternalism is too dynamical. In contrast to both, I intend to 
show that the most challenging understanding of eternalism —which I will call “perspecti-
val eternalism”7— is (still) incompatible with Power metaphysics, and that sharpened non-
eternalism is in fact incompatible with Humeanism.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to spelling out (non-)eternal-
ism to the extent as needed. Subsequently, the metaphysics of laws enter: Section 3 argues 
in favor of Humeanism requiring (perspectival) eternalism, and Section 4 defends Power 
metaphysics implying (sharpened) non-eternalism. Humean contingency cannot stand 
within a (really) dynamical world, whereas dispositions cannot exercise their productive 
powers within (any sort of) the block universe. Both packages are independent of whether 
the world is (in)deterministic.
2. Spelling out (non-)eternalism
In this section, I will firstly spell out the most challenging understanding of eternalism. It 
includes a perspectival sense of existence, namely a temporally restricted way of being ac-
5 Maudlin (2007, chap. 2) defends the non-Humean view that laws are irreducible, i.e. given primitively. 
He also assumes the block universe but rightly does not claim that one is committed to eternalism by 
the assumption that laws are primitive.
6 With respect to the past, the same holds for growing blockers.
7 It is “most challenging” for non-eternalists, because it makes it most difficult to establish a contrast 
view to eternalism.
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cording to which as of the time of dinosaurs no computer exists.8 Thus, eternalism does 
neither imply that everything exists eternally in the sense of always nor that existentially 
nothing happens at all; instead, there is a sense in which from time to time different things 
exist. It is a sense of temporal variability, however, that must be compatible with the non-
perspectival sense of existence according to which dinosaurs and computers exist on a par. 
Correspondingly, the mere focus on perspectival existence is not sufficient for the oppo-
nent views of growing block or presentism; non-eternalism has to be sharpened by rather 
modifying the non-perspectival sense of existence. In short, eternalism turns out to be more 
‘dynamical’ than (perhaps) assumed, and non-eternalism must accordingly be even more 
dynamical, i.e. truly dynamical.
My purpose in this paper is to say (1) that Humeanism requires eternalism and so that 
the apparent compatibility of Humeanism with the growing block view is rather the compat-
ibility of Humeanism with perspectival eternalism, and (2) that Power metaphysics is incom-
patible even with the most challenging understanding of eternalism, but properties as being 
essentially dispositional require sharpened growing block view or presentism in order to ex-
ercise their powers. This implies that (local) indeterminism does not lead to growing block 
—i.e. “open-future Humeanism” (see Hüttemann 2014, with reference to Beebee and Mele 
2002) does not equal “non-eternalist Humeanism” (see Backmann 2016)—, and that deter-
minism as objective metaphysical necessity does not undermine the productively dynami-
cal Power world. Again: (1) even perspectival eternalism assumes, for each physical token, 
an existential independence without which Humean contingency cannot stand, and (2) the 
existential dependence of physical tokens on being (formerly) present —as it is required by 
sharpened non-eternalism— is of a dynamical character without which dispositions cannot 
exercise their powers. In particular, existential dependence on being (formerly) present turns 
out to be productively dynamical when combined with Power metaphysics of laws. Further, 
this is independent of whether the laws are deterministic or probabilistic.
Crucially, perspectival eternalism has to be characterized by a combination of an unre-
stricted and a temporally restricted sense of existence. Applied to Minkowski’s block uni-
verse, one possibility is the following:9
(Tenseless) Existence [simpliciter]: event e exists in a non-perspectival sense of existence iff it is 
located somewhere in spacetime, i.e. at some spacetime point p or other.
(Tenseless) Existence [as of p]: event e exists in a perspectival sense of existence, i.e. (tense-
lessly) as of a given p, iff it is located at p or at some p' within or on the (so-called) past lightcone 
of p.
8 My crucial distinction between “existence simpliciter” and “existence as of t” —to be introduced be-
low— is very close to similar distinctions in Sider (2001, 59) and Lewis (2004, 3-4). However, there 
are many authors who apparently disagree: Tooley, a growing blocker, characterizes eternalism as the 
view that “all temporal states of affairs are actual as of all times” (Tooley 1997, 41; but see also the reply 
in Mellor 1998, 83); Savitt, a philosopher of spacetime physics, (mis-)characterizes a model analogous 
to the one presented below as a “synthesis” of eternalism and presentism rather than just (perspectival) 
eternalism (see Savitt 2006, sec. 2); Deasy, a moving-spotlight eternalist, says that eternalism is charac-
terized by permanentism: “it is always the case that everything exists eternally” (Deasy 2015, 2074).
9 In this way, I would interpret the Clifton and Hogarth (1995) approach of special relativistic space-
times.
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The non-perspectival sense of existence is intended to express the idea that eternalism 
is a static view of temporal existence. Note, however, that the perspectival sense of ex-
istence is not merely pragmatic nor epistemic. For, the temporal perspective is not a 
perspective that ‘one chooses’, but there rather are objective restrictions in the world. 
What exists as of p objectively differs from what exists as of p'. What makes this eternal-
istic is the fact that both restrictions are ontologically on a par, i.e. every entity, may it 
exist as of p or as of p' (or, both), exists simpliciter. Again, this does not mean that exist-
ing simpliciter is existing truly, while existing as-of-p is somehow deficient: according to 
perspectival eternalism, there simply are two different ways in which an object, event, or 
property exists.
Note further that the perspectival sense of existence does not necessarily include the 
(so-called) past. Instead, one may argue, for whatever reason, that as of p there exists only 
the entity located at p. Alternatively, in Newtonian spacetime all events exist as of p that 
are absolutely simultaneous (or, earlier) than the given event located at p. In general rela-
tivity it may again be different. What matters is that such dispute only concerns the re-
strictive sense of existence. All these variants can be considered as variants that have in 
common the given non-perspectival sense of existence. Thus, they all are variants of eter-
nalism. Eternalism turns out to be more challenging, since now the opponents can no 
longer focus on the perspectival sense of existence but must modify the non-perspectival 
one.
The sharpened non-eternalist views must hold that the unrestricted sense of existence is 
temporally variable; what exists simpliciter varies with time. In particular, according to pre-
sentism, there seems to be only one single temporal perspective, namely the present one. 
Reasonably, the so-called present perspective is not even a perspective at all; for, there can-
not be, in principle, a different one. Accordingly, the presentist’s non-perspectival sense of 
existence is tensed (see, analogously, Hestevold and Carter 2002):
(Tensed) Existence [simpliciter]: event e exists in a non-perspectival sense of existence iff it is 
present.
According to the sharpened dynamical growing block view, it does not only ‘vary’ what ex-
ists as of p (or, t) but it really varies what exists simpliciter.10
Regarding the connection with Humeanism or Power metaphysics, the questions to be 
answered turn out to be the following:
1. Is it possible that the simpliciter-totality on which the Humean laws supervene is 
temporally variable (e.g., growing)?
2. Is it possible that the local properties out of which the Power laws “flow” (Bird 
2007, 2) are those existing perspectively as of p (or, t)?
Before going on, a short remark on the challenge from relativity is in order here. The chal-
lenge says that relativity is incompatible with non-eternalism. If so, the lesson of the subse-
quent two sections is that Power metaphysics is ruled out by relativity.
10 Note that the alleged variety as of t does not mean that it changes what exists as of a given t, say: t0, but 
only that what exist as of t is different from what exists as of another time t'; and so with p and p' in 
spacetime.
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However, some arguments in favor of relativity requiring eternalism in fact only strike 
against the growing block view but not against presentism. It is said, e.g., that the ‘moving’ 
edge of being constitutes a global time order within the increasing block, but (general) rel-
ativity includes models of the universe with closed timelike curves, i.e. without a globally 
consistent time order. Presentism, by contrast, is perfectly compatible with (or, even re-
quired by) the view that time is fundamentally temporal directionality and does not im-
ply that the ‘moving’ Now automatically constitutes a globally consistent time order (see 
Friebe 2016). Further, Earman argues that the causal set approach to quantum gravity sug-
gests that a growing block emerges by underlying productive causality (see Earman 2008, 
sec. 7). Here, the growing block is connected essentially with productive causation; so there 
is justified hope in the kindness of nature that the speculative piece of Section 4 can be nat-
uralized.11
3. Humeanism requires eternalism
Consider, with these ontologies of time in mind, the metaphysics of laws. In this section, 
I will defend the claim that Humeanism requires eternalism, i.e. that the simpliciter-tota-
lity as the supervenience basis for laws (the Humean mosaic) must be the block universe. 
I offer two arguments. The first argument says that Humeanism cannot answer the chan-
ging-laws challenge that arises when one takes seriously the (sharpened) dynamical views 
of temporal existence. The second says that Humeanism implies contingency in a way 
that makes everything existentially independent of anything other, whereas in a dynamical 
world objects, events, or properties are existentially dependent on being (formerly) pre-
sent.
To begin with, I will firstly debug the impression to the contrary that Humeanism 
is compatible at least with the growing block view. The impression has to do with con-
founding “open future Humeanism” with “non-eternalist Humeanism”:12 In my view, 
open-future Humeanism is a debatable position, but non-eternalist Humeanism is not. It 
is important, for my purpose, to firstly clarify this issue because the (mis-)identification of 
open-future Humeanism with non-eternalist Humeanism is motivated by (partly right) 
observations on indeterminism. However, I want to argue that the determinism/indeter-
minism distinction doesn’t matter!
The reasoning (to be debugged) goes as follows: Following Lewis there is a certain sort 
of indeterminism compatible both with Humeanism and with his underlying eternalist as-
sumption. Let’s call it “global indeterminism”. However, as Beebee and Mele (2002) have 
shown, there is a quite different sort of indeterminism compatible with Humeanism, call it 
“local indeterminism”. This sort of indeterminism seems to be non-Lewisian and so contra-
dicts his eternalist assumption. Therefore, Humeanism is also compatible with non-eter-
11 Note that such a naturalized metaphysics would reject the idea that non-eternalism can stand without 
causation/laws. In fact, Earman opens the door for the package production/growing block as a bicon-
ditional.
12 Open-future Humeanism traces back to Beebee and Mele (2002); it has been criticized in Hüttemann 
(2014). As it seems to me, many authors identify this open-future Humeanism with non-eternalist 
(growing block) Humeanism, explicitly in Backmann (2016).
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nalism. Against it, I will firstly argue that even this local indeterminism is compatible with 
(perspectival) eternalism (whereas, as will be argued subsequently, (sharpened) non-eter-
nalism is in fact incompatible with Humeanism).
Global indeterminism states the following. The Humean mosaic consists in categorical 
properties distributed over the static simpliciter-whole of spacetime (eternalist assumption). 
Then, the Best System in accordance with this distribution can contain probabilistic laws. 
Indeterminism can be identified with these probabilistic laws. This indeterminism is onto-
logical, rather than merely epistemical, although epistemic virtues (simplicity, strength, bal-
ance) are involved in the characterization of the Best System. For, in the world there really 
is, e.g., a 50/50-distribution of spin-up/spin-down outcomes when spin-measurements are 
made. It is global, rather than local, since the outcome of a spin-measurement at p is inde-
termined by the events located in (or, on) the past lightcone of p only because the outcome 
is different at some other point p' where the situation is completely similar. Locally, by con-
trast, there is only one real future, i.e. there is no branching of different possible futures 
there. As it seems, global indeterminism is compatible with eternalism precisely because in 
the local future lightcone of p the particular outcome of the measurement at p is ‘already 
given’.
Local, but still Humean, indeterminism consists in the (apparent) absence of constrain-
ing laws as of a given time t or spacetime point p. Since the Humean supervenience basis of 
laws must be the totality, the whole of time or spacetime, the eternal simpliciter-laws hold 
timelessly, i.e. not already at a given time t (or, p). They do not hold always, not at every 
time, but only at the end of time (if there is any). Before the end of time, namely at t (or, 
p), hence as long as time progresses, the Humean mosaic is “incomplete”. The reductive 
laws are fixed only when the world has come to an end; before that, the supervenience basis 
needs to be completed. Time progresses, and the whole of spacetime successively emerges 
until, at the very last moment, it will be complete. The eternal simpliciter-laws do not de-
termine the course of events, but the events determine what at the end of the universe these 
laws will be. All this sounds ‘dynamical’, so that it, seemingly, cannot be said with the eter-
nalist assumption.
With only global indeterminism, the underlying whole is simply ‘given’, the laws 
are ‘eternally’ fixed, period: nothing happens. With local indeterminsim, in contrast, 
the local future is not ‘already’ given, apparently in conflict with the ‘givenness’ of all 
entities according to eternalism. So, global indeterminism requires eternalism, but local 
indeterminism requires non-eternalism. However, this reasoning is wrong: eternalism, 
so understood, is misleadingly characterized only by the ‘perspective from nowhere’. By 
contrast, perspectival eternalism must be characterized both non-perspectivally (from 
God’s eye) as well as by temporal restrictions, as of t (or, p). Open-future Humeanism 
(local indeterminism) can perfectly be based on perspectival eternalism and must be so: 
on the sharpened non-eternalist assumption, the Humean mosaic would always be com-
plete; it is not incomplete presently or as of the edge of being. The simpliciter-totality on 
which the laws supervene varies with time, e.g., is growing according to the sharpened 
growing block view. From this it follows my first argument for Humeanism requiring 
eternalism.
First argument: non-eternalist Humeanism is at odds with the stability of laws. Usu-
ally, one assumes that the laws of nature are more or less stable, i.e. they generally do not 
change over time. Every metaphysics of laws has to provide an explanation for (or, at least, 
84 Cord Friebe
Theoria 33/1 (2018): 77-89
to be in accordance with) the temporal stability of laws.13 Taking seriously the difference 
between perspectival eternalism and the sharpened growing block view (or, sharpened pre-
sentism), it turns out that on the eternalist assumption one can properly respond to the 
changing-laws challenge but on the non-eternalist assumption one cannot. The crucial 
point is that a complete Humean mosaic contains all tokens that exist simpliciter, i.e. the 
supervenience basis for the laws includes the simpliciter-totality of all entities. With regard 
to (perspectival) eternalism, the totality is static, the unchanging whole of spacetime, and 
so the laws supervening on it are eternal at least in the sense of temporally stable. With re-
gard to (sharpened) non-eternalism, however, the simpliciter-totality changes, and so, with 
Humean contingency, the supervening laws threaten to change, often and rapidly, as well.
Admittedly, open-future Humeanism is confronted with a similar challenge, but, on 
the perspectival eternalist assumption, there seems to be a consistent strategy to answer 
it.14 Here is the (no-laws) challenge for open-future Humeanism: If it is true that there is 
not only the simpliciter-totality but also (infinitely many) objective temporal restrictions 
and if it is true that, as of p (or, t), the mosaic contains only those events that exist as of that 
p, then the local supervenience basis really is incomplete. So, apparently, no laws are given 
then, and the arising challenge is the threat that nature starts to behave very differently af-
ter p.
My response goes as follows. Since, on the (perspectival) eternalist assumption, the mo-
saic as of p is a restriction of the mosaic simpliciter, there are indeed as-of-p laws holding at 
p which result by p-indexing the eternal laws (see, analogously, Backmann 2016).15 The as-
of-p laws, as p-restrictions of the simpliciter-law(s), must be compatible with them. If, e.g., 
there is no faster-than-light signal so far, there might be a reason why it is so: because the 
contrary would be inconsistent with the simpliciter-laws supervening on the whole from 
which ‘as-of-p’ is merely a restriction. In other words, the notion of Humean contingency 
comes in different strengths. In one sense, namely simpliciter (non-perspectival), the prop-
erty distribution is contingent in the way that in another possible world the distribution 
is completely different including completely different laws supervening on it. In another 
sense, namely from a temporal restriction (perspectival), it is contingent how the world 
proceeds.
In the latter case, there also is a larger pattern (the totality) —given from nowhere— in 
virtue of which the perspectival contingency is constrained. Here is room for justified hope 
in the kindness of nature that it will not behave very differently after p. Although there still 
might be sophisticated arguments against open-future Humeanism, there is, after all, ap-
13 Briggs and Forbes (2017) argue why changing laws really are disadvantageous, namely because then 
there are no non-trivial views about the future, and explanations about the past are unstable. It seems, 
however, that Briggs and Forbes take it for granted that Humeanism plus Growing Block implies 
changing laws. The purpose of this section is to defend this implication against impressions to the con-
trary, which can only be done by distinguishing perspectival eternalism and sharpened non-eternalism.
14 This is to say that, if one distinguishes carefully open-future Humeanism from (alleged) non-eternal-
ist Humeanism, one can defend Backmann’s (2016) strategy against the worries raised by Hüttemann 
(2014).
15 Example: take as simpliciter-law that spin measurement outcomes are 50/50, but as of p 70% show 
spin-up. Then, I would say that an as-of-p law says 70% spin-up, which is a consistent p-restriction of 
the simpliciter-law.
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parently a consistent defense strategy. There is none, by contrast, on the (sharpened) non-
eternalist assumption.
For, if “now” is not only an indexical indicating a temporal restriction, as it would 
be according to (perspectival) eternalism, but if “now” refers to the ontological (edge of) 
being, then, presently, the simpliciter-laws are fixed (and not only at the very end of the 
world). At the edge of being, the (alleged) supervenience basis is not incomplete —not to 
be completed at the very end of the world— but it is already always complete.16 However, 
since it changes over time what exists simpliciter (the totality itself is growing according to 
the sharpened growing block view), the varying so-far laws no longer are restrictions of eter-
nal simpliciter-laws. Thus, there is no longer a Humean way to eternal laws, so no longer a 
way to temporally stable laws.
The hope in the kindness of nature is, in non-eternalist Humeanism, no longer jus-
tified: the (essential) Humean contingency cannot be constrained, but there is only the 
strong sense of contingency available in non-eternalist Humeanism. The complete super-
venience basis is continuously changing, and this change of the totality is, on the Humean 
assumption, entirely contingent and independent of the so-far laws. Hence, the reductive 
laws that continuously supervene on this changing mosaic likely will always be different. 
Therefore, non-eternalist Humeanism cannot explain (or, is even in conflict with) the tem-
poral stability of laws.
Second argument in favor of Humeanism requiring eternalism: Humeanism is non-
productive which requires an ontology of time according to which physical tokens are 
existentially independent. Even the most challenging understanding of eternalism as-
sumes existential independence of every object, event, or property from anything other, 
whereas according to the sharpened dynamical views of temporal existence physical to-
kens existentially depend on being (formerly) present. Perspectival eternalism allows 
that as of the time of dinosaurs no computers exist; so it allows for succession and com-
ing into being, in the perspectival sense. However, the perspectival sense only is a re-
striction of the non-perspectival sense of existence, i.e. being located somewhere in 
spacetime. From this it follows that the perspectival realization relation pRp'—read: 
whatever is located at p' is realized as of p—is unconditioned reflexive: “R is surely re-
flexive” (Saunders 2002, 283).
The perspectival sense of existence substantially concerns only physical tokens located 
somewhere else. All the mentioned variants of eternalism (see Section 2) differ in what is re-
alized as of a given p—whether everything absolutely simultaneous with p, or everything 
in the past lightcone of p, or what not—, as long as one considers entities located at some 
other point p'. They all have necessarily in common that the entity located at the given p is 
realized as of that p. The eternalist assumption is precisely this: everything exists as of the p 
of its own location. Every non-eternalist ontology of time denies precisely this by claiming 
that something substantial must be added to ‘being located at p’ in order to be realized as of 
p: namely being (formerly) presently located at p.
Humeanism requries the eternalist existential independence because it says that noth-
ing substantial will be added to ‘being located at p’ if one states that the physical token has 
16 As of a time t earlier than the edge of being the situation (in the growing block) is apparently analo-
gous to eternalism.
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been produced at p.17 In a Humean world, the (deterministic or probabilistic) laws are not 
responsible for the distribution of the fundamental physical properties. Thus, they are 
not the ground for the existence of that development (which is even uncontroversial). Hu-
mean metaphysics assumes that either the existence of each object, event, or property is un-
grounded or the ground for their existence is internal, i.e. it lies somehow within each en-
tity considered for itself.
Take, e.g., charge and its alleged power to create an electromagnetic field. The Hu-
means agree with other views, in particular with Power metaphysics, about which physi-
cal tokens there are in the world. They disagree about the ontological status of these things, 
events, or properties. Humean contingency requires that the physical tokens simply succeed 
one another although some causal relations may supervene on them. The succession is sim-
ple exactly if the tokens are existentially independent from anything other; there are no ex-
istential dependence relations between distinct properties or events, nor do they depend 
existentially on laws or whatever else, e.g., not on a ‘moving’ present. Being located at p is 
the primitive concept, as well as according to eternalism, and nothing substantial would be 
added if one said that the entity e has been produced at p.18
The crucial point is that one must take seriously the difference between the ‘dynamical’ 
becoming, which is accepted by the reasonable eternalists via the perspectival sense of exist-
ence, and the dynamical becoming required by sharpened non-eternalism via the temporally 
variable simpliciter-existence. Humean contingency cannot stand in a dynamical world, be-
cause in such a world physical tokens are existentially dependent on the ‘moving’ present.
4. Power metaphysics requires non-eternalism
Let me now turn to Power metaphysics. I will defend the claim that essential dispositional-
ism requires the sharpened non-eternalist views. The argument says that dispositions only 
can exercise their powers to bring about other (later) physical tokens if they are present, 
i.e., with the growing block view in mind, located on the edge of being. Dispositions would 
be powerless if they existed merely perspectively at t (or, p). For, then, their manifestations 
would likewise exist merely perspectively at t' (or, p'), and, hence, both the dispositions and 
their manifestations would be ‘given’ anyway, i.e. they would equally exist simpliciter. Con-
trariwise, simpliciter-existence must vary with time.19
17 Nevertheless, Bourne (2006) apparently defends a Humean presentism. However, he does not explain 
how his abstract ersatzer moments of time become concrete present moments. In this way, the sharp-
ened dynamical nature of presentism is disguised.
18 Semantically, the statements “e is located at p” and “e has been produced at p” have (according to Hu-
meanism) the same truth-conditions, and so active production can be reduced ontologically on passive 
location.
19 Here, an objection may be raised (see Backmann 2017) that, on the growing block view, properties 
lose their productive power when becoming past, which contradicts the idea that they are essentially 
dispositional. My possible response goes as follows: Probably, the growing blockers must modify their 
view. If it is true that what exists simpliciter varies temporally, then —on the growing view— both the 
present and the past (but not the future) successively come into existence. Thus, on the growing block 
view the past is not analogous to eternalism but has its own characteristic status which does not make 
the past properties powerless.
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Still, there is the widespread intuition that Power metaphysics is compatible with the 
block universe view (see, e.g., Esfeld 2008, chap. 5). The idea firstly seems to be that the 
crucial difference between categoricalism and dispositionalism is that the latter recog-
nizes metaphysically necessary connections (or, tendencies) among distinct physical tokens, 
whereas the former denies them. These modal relations allegedly can hold between (or, 
even require) ‘already’ existing relata. So understood, Power metaphysics lacks productive 
sense and is, therefore, compatible with eternalism. Connected with this understanding is 
the requirement that one needs (a particular sort of) indeterminism to save oneself from 
the block universe view (see McCall 1976; and Müller 2006, 456). By contrast, I hold that 
indeterminism gets its (desired) productive sense from sharpened dynamical temporal ex-
istence, and not the other way around.
De-re modal relations of necessity or tendency, I suggest, are underestimated if one de-
nies their productive sense. If a necessitates (or, is a tendency for) b, b cannot exist ‘anyway’, 
i.e. the realization relation cannot be unconditioned reflexive. Rather, b only is located at 
its time t (or, its spacetime location p) when necessitated or successfully be *tendenced*, i.e. 
in English: brought about. To mimic Lewis’s complaint with Armstrong’s necessity rela-
tion, I would say that “metaphysical necessity” and “tendency” are mere labels when not 
combined with productive sense.
However, one even may argue that dispositions are productive without bringing the 
future into reality. Admittedly, a ‘present’ disposition brings about a later event but, the ob-
jection goes, if “now” is merely an indexical indicating a temporal restriction —as it is ac-
cording to eternalism—, this holds for all dispositions, likewise for so-called past, present, 
and future ones. The dependence of the particular manifestation on the particular disposi-
tion allegedly is merely perspectival, whereas from God’s eye —considered to be the truly 
eternalist ‘perspective’— everything, every disposition together with every manifestation, 
exists simpliciter. Against it, I argue that even the most challenging understanding of eter-
nalism cannot do justice to the productive Power requirement that manifestations are ex-
istentially dependent on dispositions. Even if it is true that computers do not exist as of the 
time of dinosaurs, they do not existentially depend on something in their past. For, they 
still exist simpliciter which, in the eternalist understanding, implies that their existence does 
not depend on anything other. As being argued, the eternalist realization relation is “surely 
reflexive” (Saunders 2002, 283).
If the essential difference between categoricalism and dispositionalism is that the latter 
requires existential dependence relations between different physical tokens, then the regular-
ities in the world are not simply given but generated (see Esfeld 2008, chap. 5). A given ob-
ject, event, or property has been produced. It existentially depends on something external, 
on other (earlier) dispositional properties, probably together with the active Power laws. 
Something other is the ground for the existence of the given token; it has had the power to 
produce the given particular.20 Thus, according to Power metaphysics, something substan-
tial has in fact to be added to ‘being located at p’: entity e has been produced at p. This ex-
20 Note that the reasoning goes from some actual manifestation to the earlier disposition (and not the 
other way around): this avoids worries with antidote-cases. As Schrenk (2010) argues, dispositionalism 
is also confronted with antidote-cases and so ‘metaphysical necessity’ doesn’t help. However, the dif-
ference still is that the actual token that has not been prevented by antidotes has been produced at p, i.e. 
it is not merely located at p.
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ternal ground of the existence of concrete particulars is incompatible (even) with the most 
challenging understanding of eternalism which requires, instead, that nothing substantial 
can be added to ‘being located at p’.
Power metaphysics needs the existential dependence on something external which is 
provided by the sharpened presentist’s or growing blocker’s idea that what exists at p de-
pends on p being (formerly) present. This existentially dynamical presentness can become 
(and actually becomes) productive in virtue of dispositions and Power laws. According to 
perspectival eternalism (as well as according to Humeanism) physical tokens simply suc-
ceed one another, e.g., along a timelike curve in spacetime. According to growing block 
and presentism, the present (the edge of being) comes successively into existence simplic-
iter. (Only) this can be turned into a productive succession by dispositions and Power 
laws.
To sum up the connected argument from (non-)productiveness/existential (in)de-
pendence: Eternalists and Humean metaphysicians agree that nothing substantial will be 
added if one states that the physical token is presently located at p or has been produced 
at p; both “being present” and “being produced”, over and above of being located, sound 
rather mysterious both for the eternalist’s and Humean habit. In contrast, both non-eter-
nalists as well as Power metaphysicians agree that something substantial could and should 
be added to that ‘being located at p’. According to dynamical views of time, it makes an es-
sential difference if something is (formerly) presently located at p or not. Likewise, accord-
ing to the dispositionalists, it makes an essential, ontological difference if something has 
been produced at p or not. The connection is not casual: for, the Power metaphysicians 
must argue that “to be present” has productive sense. Thus, only in the (sharpened) dynam-
ical world the dispositions can exercise their productive power.
Everything being said so far is independent of whether the Power laws are determinis-
tic or probabilistic. Also, it is independent of whether the laws hold exceptionless or allow 
for (few and irregular) anomalies. In any case, Power laws have productive essence as long 
as simpliciter-existence is temporally variable.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, look at growing blocker’s view about the connection of the metaphysics of 
laws, eternalism and (in)determinism:
Regardless of whether one adopts a realist or a reductionist view of laws of nature, there is no 
reason why a static world cannot contain indeterministic laws. (Tooley 1997, 27)
This is troublesome. Though it may be true that eternalism is compatible with indetermin-
ism regardless of whether one adopts primitivism of laws (the “realist” view from Maud-
lin) or Humeanism, the static world cannot contain indeterministic Power laws. Such a 
“realist” view of laws of nature is incompatible with a static world but requires the grow-
ing block view or presentism. However, this is so independently of whether those laws are 
probabilistic or deterministic. The productiveness of Power metaphysics does not stem 
from its laws, let alone from indeterministic laws, but from the dynamical existence of dis-
positions and their manifestations.
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